Institutional Shareholder Services Inc.
2011 U.S. Proxy Voting Guidelines Concise Summary
(Digest of Selected Key Guidelines)
January 3, 2011
Routine/Miscellaneous
Auditor Ratification
Vote FOR proposals to ratify auditors, unless any of the following apply:
- An auditor has a financial interest in or association with the company, and is therefore not independent;
- There is reason to believe that the independent auditor has rendered an opinion which is neither accurate nor indicative of the company’s financial position;
- Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a serious level of concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures; or
- Fees for non-audit services (“Other” fees) are excessive.
Non-audit fees are excessive if:
- Non-audit (“other”) fees >audit fees + audit-related fees + tax compliance/preparation fees
Board of Directors
Voting on Director Nominees in Uncontested Elections
Votes on director nominees should be determined CASE-BY-CASE.
Four fundamental principles apply when determining votes on director nominees:
1. Board Accountability
2. Board Responsiveness
3. Director Independence
4. Director Competence
1. Board Accountability
VOTE WITHHOLD/AGAINST1 the entire board of directors (except new nominees2, who should be considered CASE-BY-CASE), for the following:
Problematic Takeover Defenses:
1.1. The board is classified, and a continuing director responsible for a problematic governance issue at the board/committee level that would warrant a withhold/against vote recommendation is not up for election -- any or all appropriate nominees (except new) may be held accountable;
1 In general, companies with a plurality vote standard use “Withhold” as the valid contrary vote option in director elections; companies with a majority vote standard use “Against”. However, it will vary by company and the proxy must be checked to determine the valid contrary vote option for the particular company.
2 A “new nominee” is any current nominee who has not already been elected by shareholders and who joined the board after the problematic action in question transpired. If ISS cannot determine whether the nominee joined the board before or after the problematic action transpired, the nominee will be considered a “new nominee” if he or she joined the board within the 12 months prior to the upcoming shareholder meeting.
1.2. The board lacks accountability and oversight, coupled with sustained poor performance relative to peers. Sustained poor performance is measured by one- and three-year total shareholder returns in the bottom half of a company’s four-digit GICS industry group (Russell 3000 companies only). Take into consideration the company’s five-year total shareholder return and five-year operational metrics. Problematic provisions include but are not limited to:
- A classified board structure;
- A supermajority vote requirement;
- Majority vote standard for director elections with no carve out for contested elections;
- The inability for shareholders to call special meetings;
- The inability for shareholders to act by written consent;
- A dual-class structure; and/or
- A non-shareholder approved poison pill.
1.3. The company’s poison pill has a “dead-hand” or “modified dead-hand” feature. Vote withhold/against every year until this feature is removed;
1.4. The board adopts a poison pill with a term of more than 12 months (“long-term pill”), or renews any existing pill, including any “short-term” pill (12 months or less), without shareholder approval. A commitment or policy that puts a newly-adopted pill to a binding shareholder vote may potentially offset an adverse vote recommendation. Review such companies with classified boards every year, and such companies with annually-elected boards at least once every three years, and vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD votes from all nominees if the company still maintains a non-shareholder-approved poison pill. This policy applies to all companies adopting or renewing pills after the announcement of this policy (Nov 19, 2009);
1.5. The board makes a material adverse change to an existing poison pill without shareholder approval.
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on all nominees if:
1.6. the board adopts a poison pill with a term of 12 months or less (“short-term pill”) without shareholder approval, taking into account the following factors:
- The date of the pill‘s adoption relative to the date of the next meeting of shareholders- i.e. whether the company had time to put the pill on ballot for shareholder ratification given the circumstances;
- The issuer‘s rationale;
- The issuer's governance structure and practices; and
- The issuer's track record of accountability to shareholders.
Problematic Audit-Related Practices
Generally, vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from the members of the Audit Committee if:
1.7. The non-audit fees paid to the auditor are excessive (see discussion under “Auditor Ratification”);
1.8. The company receives an adverse opinion on the company’s financial statements from its auditor; or
1.9. There is persuasive evidence that the audit committee entered into an inappropriate indemnification agreement with its auditor that limits the ability of the company, or its shareholders, to pursue legitimate legal recourse against the audit firm.
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on members of the Audit Committee and/or the full board if:
1.10. Poor accounting practices are identified that rise to a level of serious concern, such as: fraud; misapplication of GAAP; and material weaknesses identified in Section 404 disclosures. Examine the severity, breadth, chronological sequence and duration, as well as the company’s efforts at remediation or corrective actions, in determining whether WITHHOLD/AGAINST votes are warranted.
Problematic Compensation Practices
Vote WITHHOLD/AGAINST the members of the Compensation Committee and potentially the full board if:
1.11. There is a negative correlation between chief executive pay and company performance (see Pay for Performance Policy);
1.12. The company reprices underwater options for stock, cash, or other consideration without prior shareholder approval, even if allowed in the company's equity plan;
1.13. The company fails to submit one-time transfers of stock options to a shareholder vote;
1.14. The company fails to fulfill the terms of a burn rate commitment made to shareholders;
1.15. The company has problematic pay practices. Problematic pay practices may warrant withholding votes from the CEO and potentially the entire board as well.
Governance Failures
Under extraordinary circumstances, vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from directors individually, committee members, or the entire board, due to:
1.16. Material failures of governance, stewardship, or fiduciary responsibilities at the company;
1.17. Failure to replace management as appropriate; or
1.18. Egregious actions related to the director(s)’ service on other boards that raise substantial doubt about his or her ability to effectively oversee management and serve the best interests of shareholders at any company.
2. Board Responsiveness
Vote WITHHOLD/AGAINST the entire board of directors (except new nominees, who should be considered CASE-BY-CASE), if:
2.1. The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received approval by a majority of the shares outstanding the previous year; or
2.2. The board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received approval of the majority of shares cast in the last year and one of the two previous years.
2.3. The board failed to act on takeover offers where the majority of the shareholders tendered their shares; or
2.4. At the previous board election, any director received more than 50 percent withhold/against votes of the shares cast and the company has failed to address the issue(s) that caused the high withhold/against vote.
3. Director Independence
Vote WITHHOLD/AGAINST Inside Directors and Affiliated Outside Directors (per the Categorization of Directors) when:
3.1. The inside or affiliated outside director serves on any of the three key committees: audit, compensation, or nominating;
3.2. The company lacks an audit, compensation, or nominating committee so that the full board functions as that committee;
3.3. The company lacks a formal nominating committee, even if the board attests that the independent directors fulfill the functions of such a committee; or
3.4. The full board is less than majority independent.
4. Director Competence
VOTE WITHHOLD/AGAINST the entire board of directors (except new nominees, who should be considered CASE-BY-CASE), if:
4.1. The company’s proxy indicates that not all directors attended 75 percent of the aggregate board and committee meetings, but fails to provide the required disclosure of the names of the director(s) involved.
Generally vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from individual directors who:
4.2. Attend less than 75 percent of the board and committee meetings (with the exception of new nominees). Acceptable reasons for director(s) absences are generally limited to the following
- Medical issues/illness;
- Family emergencies; and
- If the director's total service was three meetings or fewer and the director missed only one meeting.
These reasons for directors' absences will only be considered by ISS if disclosed in the proxy or another SEC filing. If the disclosure is insufficient to determine whether a director attended at least 75 percent of board and committee meetings in aggregate, vote AGAINST/WITHHOLD from the director.
Vote AGAINST or WITHHOLD from individual directors who:
4.3. Sit on more than six public company boards; or
4.4. Are CEOs of public companies who sit on the boards of more than two public companies besides their own-- withhold only at their outside boards.
Voting for Director Nominees in Contested Elections
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on the election of directors in contested elections, considering the following factors:
- Long-term financial performance of the target company relative to its industry;
- Management’s track record;
- Background to the proxy contest;
- Qualifications of director nominees (both slates);
- Strategic plan of dissident slate and quality of critique against management;
- Likelihood that the proposed goals and objectives can be achieved (both slates);
- Stock ownership positions.
Independent Chair (Separate Chair/CEO)
Generally vote FOR shareholder proposals requiring that the chairman’s position be filled by an independent director, unless the company satisfies all of the following criteria:
The company maintains the following counterbalancing governance structure:
- Designated lead director, elected by and from the independent board members with clearly delineated and comprehensive duties. (The role may alternatively reside with a presiding director, vice chairman, or rotating lead director; however the director must serve a minimum of one year in order to qualify as a lead director.) The duties should include, but are not limited to, the following:
- presides at all meetings of the board at which the chairman is not present, including executive sessions of the independent directors;
- serves as liaison between the chairman and the independent directors;
- approves information sent to the board;
- approves meeting agendas for the board;
- approves meeting schedules to assure that there is sufficient time for discussion of all agenda items;
- has the authority to call meetings of the independent directors;
- if requested by major shareholders, ensures that he is available for consultation and direct communication;
- Two-thirds independent board;
- All independent key committees;
- Established governance guidelines;
- A company in the Russell 3000 universe must not have exhibited sustained poor total shareholder return (TSR) performance, defined as one- and three-year TSR in the bottom half of the company’s four-digit GICS industry group (using Russell 3000 companies only), unless there has been a change in the Chairman/CEO position within that time. For companies not in the Russell 3000 universe, the company must not have underperformed both its peers and index on the basis of both one-year and three-year total shareholder returns, unless there has been a change in the Chairman/CEO position within that time;
- The company does not have any problematic governance or management issues, examples of which include, but are not limited to:
- Egregious compensation practices;
- Multiple related-party transactions or other issues putting director independence at risk;
- Corporate and/or management scandals;
- Excessive problematic corporate governance provisions; or
- Flagrant actions by management or the board with potential or realized negative impacts on shareholders.
Shareholder Rights & Defenses
Net Operating Loss (NOL) Protective Amendments
Vote AGAINST proposals to adopt a protective amendment for the stated purpose of protecting a company's net operating losses (“NOLs”) if the effective term of the protective amendment would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.
Vote CASE-BY-CASE, considering the following factors, for management proposals to adopt an NOL protective amendment that would remain in effect for the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:
- The ownership threshold (NOL protective amendments generally prohibit stock ownership transfers that would result in a new 5-percent holder or increase the stock ownership percentage of an existing 5-percent holder);
- The value of the NOLs;
- Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision or commitment to cause expiration of the protective amendment upon exhaustion or expiration of the NOL);
- The company's existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and
- Any other factors that may be applicable.
Poison Pills- Management Proposals to Ratify Poison Pill
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on management proposals on poison pill ratification, focusing on the features of the shareholder rights plan. Rights plans should contain the following attributes:
- No lower than a 20% trigger, flip-in or flip-over;
- A term of no more than three years;
- No dead-hand, slow-hand, no-hand or similar feature that limits the ability of a future board to redeem the pill;
- Shareholder redemption feature (qualifying offer clause); if the board refuses to redeem the pill 90 days after a qualifying offer is announced, 10 percent of the shares may call a special meeting or seek a written consent to vote on rescinding the pill.
In addition, the rationale for adopting the pill should be thoroughly explained by the company. In examining the request for the pill, take into consideration the company’s existing governance structure, including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, and any problematic governance concerns.
Poison Pills- Management Proposals toRatify a Pill to Preserve Net Operating Losses (NOLs)
Vote AGAINST proposals to adopt a poison pill for the stated purpose of protecting a company's net operating losses (“NOLs”) if the term of the pill would exceed the shorter of three years and the exhaustion of the NOL.
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on management proposals for poison pill ratification, considering the following factors, if the term of the pill would be the shorter of three years (or less) and the exhaustion of the NOL:
- The ownership threshold to transfer (NOL pills generally have a trigger slightly below 5 percent);
- The value of the NOLs;
- Shareholder protection mechanisms (sunset provision, or commitment to cause expiration of the pill upon exhaustion or expiration of NOLs);
- The company's existing governance structure including: board independence, existing takeover defenses, track record of responsiveness to shareholders, and any other problematic governance concerns; and
- Any other factors that may be applicable.
Shareholder Ability to Act by Written Consent
Generally vote AGAINST management and shareholder proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders' ability to act by written consent.
Generally vote FOR management and shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to act by written consent, taking into account the following factors:
- Shareholders' current right to act by written consent;
- The consent threshold;
- The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;
- Investor ownership structure; and
- Shareholder support of, and management's response to, previous shareholder proposals.
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on shareholder proposals if, in addition to the considerations above, the company has the following governance and antitakeover provisions:
- An unfettered3 right for shareholders to call special meetings at a 10 percent threshold;
- A majority vote standard in uncontested director elections;
- No non-shareholder-approved pill; and
- An annually elected board.
3 "Unfettered" means no restrictions on agenda items, no restrictions on the number of shareholders who can group together to reach the 10 percent threshold, and only reasonable limits on when a meeting can be called: no greater than 30 days after the last annual meeting and no greater than 90 prior to the next annual meeting.
Shareholder Ability to Call Special Meetings
Vote AGAINST management or shareholder proposals to restrict or prohibit shareholders’ ability to call special meetings.
Generally vote FOR management or shareholder proposals that provide shareholders with the ability to call special meetings taking into account the following factors:
- Shareholders’ current right to call special meetings;
- Minimum ownership threshold necessary to call special meetings (10% preferred);
- The inclusion of exclusionary or prohibitive language;
- Investor ownership structure; and
- Shareholder support of, and management’s response to, previous shareholder proposals.
CAPITAL/RESTRUCTURING
Common Stock Authorization
Vote FOR proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with a transaction on the same ballot that warrants support.
Vote AGAINST proposals at companies with more than one class of common stock to increase the number of authorized shares of the class of common stock that has superior voting rights.
Vote AGAINST proposals to increase the number of authorized common shares if a vote for a reverse stock split on the same ballot is warranted despite the fact that the authorized shares would not be reduced proportionally.
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on all other proposals to increase the number of shares of common stock authorized for issuance. Take into account company-specific factors that include, at a minimum, the following:
- Past Board Performance:
- The company's use of authorized shares during the last three years
- The Current Request:
- Disclosure in the proxy statement of the specific purposes of the proposed increase;
- Disclosure in the proxy statement of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request; and
- The dilutive impact of the request as determined by an allowable increase calculated by ISS (typically 100 percent of existing authorized shares) that reflects the company's need for shares and total shareholder returns.
Preferred Stock Authorization
Vote FOR proposals to increase the number of authorized preferred shares where the primary purpose of the increase is to issue shares in connection with a transaction on the same ballot that warrants support.
Vote AGAINST proposals at companies with more than one class or series of preferred stock to increase the number of authorized shares of the class or series of preferred stock that has superior voting rights.
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on all other proposals to increase the number of shares of preferred stock authorized for issuance. Take into account company-specific factors that include, at a minimum, the following:
- Past Board Performance:
- The company's use of authorized preferred shares during the last three years;
- The Current Request:
- Disclosure in the proxy statement of the specific purposes for the proposed increase;
- Disclosure in the proxy statement of specific and severe risks to shareholders of not approving the request;
- In cases where the company has existing authorized preferred stock, the dilutive impact of the request as determined by an allowable increase calculated by ISS (typically 100 percent of existing authorized shares) that reflects the company's need for shares and total shareholder returns; and
- Whether the shares requested are blank check preferred shares that can be used for antitakeover purposes.
Mergers and Acquisitions
Vote CASE –BY- CASE on mergers and acquisitions. Review and evaluate the merits and drawbacks of the proposed transaction, balancing various and sometimes countervailing factors including:
- Valuation - Is the value to be received by the target shareholders (or paid by the acquirer) reasonable? While the fairness opinion may provide an initial starting point for assessing valuation reasonableness, emphasis is placed on the offer premium, market reaction and strategic rationale.
- Market reaction - How has the market responded to the proposed deal? A negative market reaction should cause closer scrutiny of a deal.
- Strategic rationale - Does the deal make sense strategically? From where is the value derived? Cost and revenue synergies should not be overly aggressive or optimistic, but reasonably achievable. Management should also have a favorable track record of successful integration of historical acquisitions.
- Negotiations and process - Were the terms of the transaction negotiated at arm's-length? Was the process fair and equitable? A fair process helps to ensure the best price for shareholders. Significant negotiation "wins" can also signify the deal makers' competency. The comprehensiveness of the sales process (e.g., full auction, partial auction, no auction) can also affect shareholder value.
- Conflicts of interest - Are insiders benefiting from the transaction disproportionately and inappropriately as compared to non-insider shareholders? As the result of potential conflicts, the directors and officers of the company may be more likely to vote to approve a merger than if they did not hold these interests. Consider whether these interests may have influenced these directors and officers to support or recommend the merger. The CIC figure presented in the "ISS Transaction Summary" section of this report is an aggregate figure that can in certain cases be a misleading indicator of the true value transfer from shareholders to insiders. Where such figure appears to be excessive, analyze the underlying assumptions to determine whether a potential conflict exists.
- Governance - Will the combined company have a better or worse governance profile than the current governance profiles of the respective parties to the transaction? If the governance profile is to change for the worse, the burden is on the company to prove that other issues (such as valuation) outweigh any deterioration in governance.
COMPENSATION
Executive Pay Evaluation
Underlying all evaluations are five global principles that most investors expect corporations to adhere to in designing and administering executive and director compensation programs:
1. Maintain appropriate pay-for-performance alignment, with emphasis on long-term shareholder value: This principle encompasses overall executive pay practices, which must be designed to attract, retain, and
appropriately motivate the key employees who drive shareholder value creation over the long term. It will take into consideration, among other factors, the link between pay and performance; the mix between fixed and variable pay; performance goals; and equity-based plan costs;
2. Avoid arrangements that risk “pay for failure”: This principle addresses the appropriateness of long or indefinite contracts, excessive severance packages, and guaranteed compensation;
3. Maintain an independent and effective compensation committee: This principle promotes oversight of executive pay programs by directors with appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, and a sound process for compensation decision-making (e.g., including access to independent expertise and advice when needed);
4. Provide shareholders with clear, comprehensive compensation disclosures: This principle underscores the importance of informative and timely disclosures that enable shareholders to evaluate executive pay practices fully and fairly;
5. Avoid inappropriate pay to non-executive directors: This principle recognizes the interests of shareholders in ensuring that compensation to outside directors does not compromise their independence and ability to make appropriate judgments in overseeing managers’ pay and performance. At the market level, it may incorporate a variety of generally accepted best practices.
Advisory Votes on Executive Compensation- Management Proposals (Management Say-on-Pay)
Evaluate executive pay and practices, as well as certain aspects of outside director compensation CASE-BY-CASE.
Vote AGAINST management say on pay (MSOP) proposals, AGAINST/WITHHOLD on compensation committee members (or, in rare cases where the full board is deemed responsible, all directors including the CEO), and/or AGAINST an equity-based incentive plan proposal if:
- There is a misalignment between CEO pay and company performance (pay for performance);
- The company maintains problematic pay practices;
- The board exhibits poor communication and responsiveness to shareholders.
Voting Alternatives
In general, the management say on pay (MSOP) ballot item is the primary focus of voting on executive pay practices-- dissatisfaction with compensation practices can be expressed by voting against MSOP rather than withholding or voting against the compensation committee. However, if there is no MSOP on the ballot, then the negative vote will apply to members of the compensation committee. In addition, in egregious cases, or if the board fails to respond to concerns raised by a prior MSOP proposal, then vote withhold or against compensation committee members (or, if the full board is deemed accountable, all directors). If the negative factors involve equity-based compensation, then vote AGAINST an equity-based plan proposal presented for shareholder approval.
Additional CASE-BY-CASE considerations for the management say on pay (MSOP) proposals:
- Evaluation of performance metrics in short-term and long-term plans, as discussed and explained in the Compensation Discussion & Analysis (CD&A). Consider the measures, goals, and target awards reported by the company for executives’ short- and long-term incentive awards: disclosure, explanation of their alignment with the company’s business strategy, and whether goals appear to be sufficiently challenging in relation to resulting payouts;
- Evaluation of peer group benchmarking used to set target pay or award opportunities. Consider the rationale stated by the company for constituents in its pay benchmarking peer group, as well as the benchmark targets it uses to set or validate executives’ pay (e.g., median, 75th percentile, etc.,) to ascertain whether the benchmarking process is sound or may result in pay “ratcheting” due to inappropriate peer group constituents (e.g., much larger companies) or targeting (e.g., above median); and
- Balance of performance-based versus non-performance-based pay. Consider the ratio of performance-based (not including plain vanilla stock options) vs. non-performance-based pay elements reported for the CEO’s latest reported fiscal year compensation, especially in conjunction with concerns about other factors such as performance metrics/goals, benchmarking practices, and pay-for-performance disconnects.
Primary Evaluation Factors for Executive Pay
Pay for Performance
Evaluate the alignment of the CEO’s pay with performance over time, focusing particularly on companies that have underperformed their peers over a sustained period. From a shareholders’ perspective, performance is predominantly gauged by the company’s stock performance over time. Even when financial or operational measures are utilized in incentive awards, the achievement related to these measures should ultimately translate into superior shareholder returns in the long-term.
Focus on companies with sustained underperformance relative to peers, considering the following key factors:
- Whether a company’s one-year and three-year total shareholder returns (“TSR”) are in the bottom half of its industry group (i.e., four-digit GICS – Global Industry Classification Group); and
- Whether the total compensation of a CEO who has served at least two consecutive fiscal years is aligned with the company’s total shareholder return over time, including both recent and long-term periods.
If a company falls in the bottom half of its four-digit GICS, further analysis of the CD&A is required to better understand the various pay elements and whether they create or reinforce shareholder alignment. Also assess the CEO’s pay relative to the company’s TSR over a time horizon of at least five years. The most recent year-over-year increase or decrease in pay remains a key consideration, but there will be additional emphasis on the long term trend of CEO total compensation relative to shareholder return. Also consider the mix of performance-based compensation relative to total compensation. In general, standard stock options or time-vested restricted stock are not considered to be performance-based. If a company provides performance-based incentives to its executives, the company is highly encouraged to provide the complete disclosure of the performance measure and goals (hurdle rate) so that shareholders can assess the rigor of the performance program. The use of non-GAAP financial metrics also makes it very challenging for shareholders to ascertain the rigor of the program as shareholders often cannot tell the type of adjustments being made and if the adjustments were made consistently. Complete and transparent disclosure helps shareholders to better understand the company’s pay for performance linkage.
Problematic Pay Practices
If the company maintains problematic pay practices, generally vote:
- AGAINST management "say on pay" (MSOP) proposals;
- AGAINST/WITHHOLD on compensation committee members (or in rare cases where the full board is deemed responsible, all directors including the CEO):
- In egregious situations;
- When no MSOP item is on the ballot; or
- When the board has failed to respond to concerns raised in prior MSOP evaluations; and/or
- AGAINST an equity incentive plan proposal if excessive non-performance-based equity awards are the major contributors to a pay-for-performance misalignment.
The focus is on executive compensation practices that contravene the global pay principles, including:
- Problematic practices related to non-performance-based compensation elements;
- Incentives that may motivate excessive risk-taking; and
- Options Backdating.
Problematic Pay Practices related to Non-Performance-Based Compensation Elements
Pay elements that are not directly based on performance are generally evaluated CASE-BY-CASE considering the context of a company's overall pay program and demonstrated pay-for-performance philosophy. Please refer to ISS' Compensation FAQ document for detail on specific pay practices that have been identified as potentially problematic and may lead to negative recommendations if they are deemed to be inappropriate or unjustified relative to executive pay best practices. The list below highlights the problematic practices that carry significant weight in this overall consideration and may result in adverse vote recommendations:
- Repricing or replacing of underwater stock options/SARS without prior shareholder approval (including cash buyouts and voluntary surrender of underwater options);
- Excessive perquisites or tax gross-ups, including any gross-up related to a secular trust or restricted stock vesting;
- New or extended agreements that provide for:
- CIC payments exceeding 3 times base salary and average/target/most recent bonus;
- CIC severance payments without involuntary job loss or substantial diminution of duties ("single" or "modified single" triggers);
- CIC payments with excise tax gross-ups (including "modified" gross-ups).
Incentives that may Motivate Excessive Risk-Taking
Assess company policies and disclosure related to compensation that could incentivize excessive risk-taking, for example:
- Multi-year guaranteed bonuses;
- A single performance metric used for short- and long-term plans;
- Lucrative severance packages;
- High pay opportunities relative to industry peers;
- Disproportionate supplemental pensions; or
- Mega annual equity grants that provide unlimited upside with no downside risk.
Factors that potentially mitigate the impact of risky incentives include rigorous claw-back provisions and robust stock ownership/holding guidelines.
Options Backdating
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on options backdating issues. Generally, when a company has recently practiced options backdating, WITHHOLD from or vote AGAINST the compensation committee, depending on the severity of the practices and the subsequent corrective actions on the part of the board. When deciding on votes on compensation committee members who oversaw questionable options grant practices or current compensation committee members who fail to respond to the issue proactively, consider several factors, including, but not limited to, the following:
- Reason and motive for the options backdating issue, such as inadvertent vs. deliberate grant date changes;
- Duration of options backdating;
- Size of restatement due to options backdating;
- Corrective actions taken by the board or compensation committee, such as canceling or re-pricing backdated options, the recouping of option gains on backdated grants; and
- Adoption of a grant policy that prohibits backdating, and creates a fixed grant schedule or window period for equity grants in the future.
A CASE-BY-CASE analysis approach allows distinctions to be made between companies that had “sloppy” plan administration versus those that acted deliberately and/or committed fraud, as well as those companies that subsequently took corrective action. Cases where companies have committed fraud are considered most egregious.
Board Communications and Responsiveness
Consider the following factors CASE-BY-CASE when evaluating ballot items related to executive pay:
- Poor disclosure practices, including:
- Unclear explanation of how the CEO is involved in the pay setting process;
- Retrospective performance targets and methodology not discussed;
- Methodology for benchmarking practices and/or peer group not disclosed and explained.
- Board’s responsiveness to investor input and engagement on compensation issues, for example:
- Failure to respond to majority-supported shareholder proposals on executive pay topics; or
- Failure to respond to concerns raised in connection with significant opposition to MSOP proposals.
Frequency of Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Management "Say on Pay")
Vote FOR annual advisory votes on compensation, which provide the most consistent and clear communication channel for shareholder concerns about companies' executive pay programs.
Voting on Golden Parachutes in an Acquisition, Merger, Consolidation, or Proposed Sale
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals to approve the company's golden parachute compensation, consistent with ISS' policies on problematic pay practices related to severance packages. Features that may lead to a vote AGAINST include:
- Recently adopted or materially amended agreements that include excise tax gross-up provisions (since prior annual meeting);
- Recently adopted or materially amended agreements that include modified single triggers (since prior annual meeting);
- Single trigger payments that will happen immediately upon a change in control, including cash payment and such items as the acceleration of performance-based equity despite the failure to achieve performance measures;
- Single-trigger vesting of equity based on a definition of change in control that requires only shareholder approval of the transaction (rather than consummation);
- Potentially excessive severance payments;
- Recent amendments or other changes that may make packages so attractive as to influence merger agreements that may not be in the best interests of shareholders;
- In the case of a substantial gross-up from pre-existing/grandfathered contract: the element that triggered the gross-up (i.e., option mega-grants at low point in stock price, unusual or outsized payments in cash or equity made or negotiated prior to the merger); or
- The company's assertion that a proposed transaction is conditioned on shareholder approval of the golden parachute advisory vote. ISS would view this as problematic from a corporate governance perspective.
In cases where the golden parachute vote is incorporated into a company's separate advisory vote on compensation ("management "say on pay"), ISS will evaluate the "say on pay" proposal in accordance with these guidelines, which may give higher weight to that component of the overall evaluation.
Equity-Based and Other Incentive Plans
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on equity-based compensation plans. Vote AGAINST the equity plan if any of the following factors apply:
- The total cost of the company’s equity plans is unreasonable;
The plan expressly permits the repricing of stock options/stock appreciate rights (SARs) without prior shareholder approval;
- The CEO is a participant in the proposed equity-based compensation plan and there is a disconnect between CEO pay and the company’s performance where over 50 percent of the year-over-year increase is attributed to equity awards (see Pay-for-Performance);
- The company’s three year burn rate exceeds the greater of 2% or the mean plus one standard deviation of its industry group but no more than two percentage points (+/-) from the prior-year industry group cap;
- Liberal Change of Control Definition: The plan provides for the acceleration of vesting of equity awards even though an actual change in control may not occur (e.g., upon shareholder approval of a transaction or the announcement of a tender offer); or
- The plan is a vehicle for problematic pay practices.
Shareholder Proposals on Compensation
Golden Coffins/Executive Death Benefits
Generally vote FOR proposals calling companies to adopt a policy of obtaining shareholder approval for any future agreements and corporate policies that could oblige the company to make payments or awards following the death of a senior executive in the form of unearned salary or bonuses, accelerated vesting or the continuation in force of unvested equity grants, perquisites and other payments or awards made in lieu of compensation. This would not apply to any benefit programs or equity plan proposals that the broad-based employee population is eligible.
Hold Equity Past Retirement or for a Significant Period of Time
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt policies requiring senior executive officers to retain all or a significant portion of the shares acquired through compensation plans, either:
- while employed and/or for two years following the termination of their employment ; or
- for a substantial period following the lapse of all other vesting requirements for the award (“lock-up period”), with ratable release of a portion of the shares annually during the lock-up period.
The following factors will be taken into account:
- Whether the company has any holding period, retention ratio, or officer ownership requirements in place. These should consist of:
- Rigorous stock ownership guidelines;
- A holding period requirement coupled with a significant long-term ownership requirement; or
- A meaningful retention ratio;
- Actual officer stock ownership and the degree to which it meets or exceeds the proponent’s suggested holding period/retention ratio or the company’s own stock ownership or retention requirements;
- Post-termination holding requirement policies or any policies aimed at mitigating risk taking by senior executives;
- Problematic pay practices, current and past, which may promote a short-term versus a long-term focus.
A rigorous stock ownership guideline should be at least 10x base salary for the CEO, with the multiple declining for other executives. A meaningful retention ratio should constitute at least 50 percent of the stock received from equity awards (on a net proceeds basis) held on a long-term basis, such as the executive’s tenure with the company or even a few years past the executive’s termination with the company.
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on shareholder proposals asking companies to adopt policies requiring Named Executive Officers to retain 75% of the shares acquired through compensation plans while employed and/or for two years following the termination of their employment, and to report to shareholders regarding this policy. The following factors will be taken into account:
- Whether the company has any holding period, retention ratio, or officer ownership requirements in place. These should consist of:
- Rigorous stock ownership guidelines, or
- A holding period requirement coupled with a significant long-term ownership requirement, or
- A meaningful retention ratio,
- Actual officer stock ownership and the degree to which it meets or exceeds the proponent’s suggested holding period/retention ratio or the company’s own stock ownership or retention requirements.
- Problematic pay practices, current and past, which may promote a short-term versus a long-term focus.
A rigorous stock ownership guideline should be at least 10x base salary for the CEO, with the multiple declining for other executives. A meaningful retention ratio should constitute at least 50 percent of the stock received from equity awards (on a net proceeds basis) held on a long-term basis, such as the executive’s tenure with the company or even a few years past the executive’s termination with the company.
Generally vote AGAINST shareholder proposals that mandate a minimum amount of stock that directors must own in order to qualify as a director or to remain on the board. While ISS favors stock ownership on the part of directors, the company should determine the appropriate ownership requirement.
Social/Environmental Issues
Overall Approach
When evaluating social and environmental shareholder proposals, ISS considers the following factors:
- Whether adoption of the proposal is likely to enhance or protect shareholder value;
- Whether the information requested concerns business issues that relate to a meaningful percentage of the company's business as measured by sales, assets, and earnings;
- The degree to which the company's stated position on the issues raised in the proposal could affect its reputation or sales, or leave it vulnerable to a boycott or selective purchasing;
- Whether the issues presented are more appropriately/effectively dealt with through governmental or company-specific action;
- Whether the company has already responded in some appropriate manner to the request embodied in the proposal;
- Whether the company's analysis and voting recommendation to shareholders are persuasive;
- What other companies have done in response to the issue addressed in the proposal;
- Whether the proposal itself is well framed and the cost of preparing the report is reasonable;
- Whether implementation of the proposal’s request would achieve the proposal’s objectives;
- Whether the subject of the proposal is best left to the discretion of the board;
- Whether the requested information is available to shareholders either from the company or from a publicly available source; and
- Whether providing this information would reveal proprietary or confidential information that would place the company at a competitive disadvantage.
Board Diversity
Generally vote FOR requests for reports on the company's efforts to diversify the board, unless:
- The gender and racial minority representation of the company’s board is reasonably inclusive in relation to companies of similar size and business; and
- The board already reports on its nominating procedures and gender and racial minority initiatives on the board and within the company.
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals asking the company to increase the gender and racial minority representation on its board, taking into account:
- The degree of existing gender and racial minority diversity on the company’s board and among its executive officers;
- The level of gender and racial minority representation that exists at the company’s industry peers;
- The company’s established process for addressing gender and racial minority board representation;
- Whether the proposal includes an overly prescriptive request to amend nominating committee charter language;
- The independence of the company’s nominating committee;
- The company uses an outside search firm to identify potential director nominees; and
- Whether the company has had recent controversies, fines, or litigation regarding equal employment practices.
Gender Identity, Sexual Orientation, and Domestic Partner Benefits
Generally vote FOR proposals seeking to amend a company’s EEO statement or diversity policies to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity, unless the change would result in excessive costs for the company.
Generally vote AGAINST proposals to extend company benefits to, or eliminate benefits from domestic partners. Decisions regarding benefits should be left to the discretion of the company.
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions
Generally vote FOR proposals requesting a report on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from company operations and/or products and operations, unless:
- The company already provides current, publicly-available information on the impacts that GHG emissions may have on the company as well as associated company policies and procedures to address related risks and/or opportunities;
- The company's level of disclosure is comparable to that of industry peers; and
- There are no significant, controversies, fines, penalties, or litigation associated with the company's GHG emissions.
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals that call for the adoption of GHG reduction goals from products and operations, taking into account:
- Overly prescriptive requests for the reduction in GHG emissions by specific amounts or within a specific time frame;
- Whether company disclosure lags behind industry peers;
- Whether the company has been the subject of recent, significant violations, fines, litigation, or controversy related to GHG emissions;
- The feasibility of reduction of GHGs given the company’s product line and current technology and;
- Whether the company already provides meaningful disclosure on GHG emissions from its products and operations.
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Compensation-Related Proposals
Generally vote AGAINST proposals to link, or report on linking, executive compensation to environmental and social criteria such as corporate downsizings, customer or employee satisfaction, community involvement, human rights, environmental performance, or predatory lending. However, the following factors will be considered:
- Whether the company has significant and persistent controversies or violations regarding social and/or environmental issues;
- Whether the company has management systems and oversight mechanisms in place regarding its social and environmental performance;
- The degree to which industry peers have incorporated similar non-financial performance criteria in their executive compensation practices; and
- The company‘s current level of disclosure regarding its environmental and social performance.
Generally vote AGAINST proposals calling for an analysis of the pay disparity between corporate executives and other non-executive employees. The value of the information sought by such proposals is unclear.
Political Contributions and Trade Associations Spending
Generally vote AGAINST proposals asking the company to affirm political nonpartisanship in the workplace so long as:
- There are no recent, significant controversies, fines or litigation regarding the company’s political contributions or trade association spending; and
- The company has procedures in place to ensure that employee contributions to company-sponsored political action committees (PACs) are strictly voluntary and prohibits coercion.
Vote AGAINST proposals to publish in newspapers and public media the company's political contributions. Such publications could present significant cost to the company without providing commensurate value to shareholders.
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals to improve the disclosure of a company's political contributions and trade association spending considering:
- Recent significant controversy or litigation related to the company’s political contributions or governmental affairs; and
- The public availability of a company policy on political contributions and trade association spending including information on the types of organizations supported, the business rationale for supporting these organizations, and the oversight and compliance procedures related to such expenditures of corporate assets.
Vote AGAINST proposals barring the company from making political contributions. Businesses are affected by legislation at the federal, state, and local level and barring political contributions can put the company at a competitive disadvantage.
Vote AGAINST proposals asking for a list of company executives, directors, consultants, legal counsels, lobbyists, or investment bankers that have prior government service and whether such service had a bearing on the business of the company. Such a list would be burdensome to prepare without providing any meaningful information to shareholders.
Labor and Human Rights Standards
Generally vote FOR proposals requesting a report on company or company supplier labor and/or human rights standards and policies unless such information is already publicly disclosed.
Vote CASE-BY-CASE on proposals to implement company or company supplier labor and/or human rights standards and policies, considering:
- The degree to which existing relevant policies and practices are disclosed;
- Whether or not existing relevant policies are consistent with internationally recognized standards;
- Whether company facilities and those of its suppliers are monitored and how;
- Company participation in fair labor organizations or other internationally recognized human rights initiatives;
- Scope and nature of business conducted in markets known to have higher risk of workplace labor/human rights abuse;
- Recent, significant company controversies, fines, or litigation regarding human rights at the company or its suppliers;
- The scope of the request; and
- Deviation from industry sector peer company standards and practices.
Sustainability Reporting
Generally vote FOR proposals requesting the company to report on its policies, initiatives, and oversight mechanisms related to social, economic, and environmental sustainability, unless:
- The company already discloses similar information through existing reports or policies such as an Environment, Health, and Safety (EHS) report; a comprehensive Code of Corporate Conduct; and/or a Diversity Report; or
- The company has formally committed to the implementation of a reporting program based on Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines or a similar standard within a specified time frame.
Item 8. Portfolio Managers of Closed End Management Investment Companies.
Bassett S. Winmill is the portfolio manager of the registrant. He is also the Chairman of the Board of the the registrant, the investment manager, the other investment company advised by the investment manager, and of Winmill & Co. Incorporated and its affiliates (“WCI”). Mr. Winmill is also the Chief Investment Strategist of the investment manager.
As of December 31, 2010, the portfolio manager compensation plan generally consists of base salary, employee benefits plan participation, qualified retirement plan participation, annual and asset level bonuses, certain prerequisites, and participation in equity based compensation plans. A portion of the portfolio manager’s compensation may be deferred based on criteria established by the investment manager, or at the election of the portfolio manager.
The portfolio manager’s base salary is determined annually by level of responsibility and tenure at the investment manager or its affiliates. The primary components of the portfolio manager’s annual bonus are based on (i) number of weeks’ salary paid as annual bonuses to employees generally of the investment manager and its affiliates, and (ii) the financial performance of the investment manager and its affiliates. A subjective component of the portfolio manager’s annual bonus is based on the portfolio manager’s overall contribution to management of the investment manager and its affiliates. Portfolio managers may receive an asset level bonus upon assets under managment of the registrant, the other investment companies advised by the investment manager and its affiliates reaching certain levels. The portfolio manager also is compensated under equity-based compensation plans linked to increases or decreases in the market value of the stock of the parent of the investment manager and its affiliates.
The portfolio manager compensation plan may give rise to potential conflicts of interest. A portfolio manager’s base pay tends to increase with additional and more complex responsibilities often reflecting increased assets under management and marketing efforts, which together indirectly link compensation to sales of Fund shares. The asset level bonus, although intended to encourage above average investment performance and account servicing, as well as lower expense ratios may give rise to potential conflicts of interest by linking compensation to sales. The management of multiple Funds and accounts (including proprietary accounts) may give rise to potential conflicts of interest if the Funds and accounts have different objectives, benchmarks, time horizons, and fees as the portfolio manager must allocate his time and investment ideas across multiple Funds and accounts. The portfolio manager may execute transactions for one Fund or account that may adversely impact the value of securities held by another Fund. Securities selected for one Fund or accounts rather than another Fund may outperform the securities selected for the Fund. The management of personal accounts may give rise to potential conflicts of interest; there is no assurance that the Funds’ codes of ethics will adequately address such conflicts.
The following table provides information relating to other (non-registrant) accounts where the portfolio manager is jointly or primarily responsible for day-to-day management as of December 31, 2010. The portfolio manager does not manage such accounts or assets with performance-based advisory fees, or other pooled investment vehicles.
Number of Registered Investment Companies
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Assets (millions)
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3
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$67
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Number of Other Accounts
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Assets (millions)
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0
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$0
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As of December 31, 2010, Bassett S. Winmill did not beneficially own any shares of the registrant. Bassett S. Winmill has indirect beneficial ownership of 638,588 registrant shares as a result of his status as a controlling person of WCI and Midas Securities Group, Inc. (formerly Investor Service Center, Inc.), the direct beneficial owner. Mr. Winmill disclaims beneficial ownership of the registrant shares held by Midas Securities Group, Inc.
Item 9. Purchases of Equity Securities by Closed-End Management Investment Company and Affiliated Purchasers.
Not applicable.
Item 10. Submission of Matters to a Vote of Security Holders.
There were no material changes to the procedures by which shareholders may recommend nominees to the registrant's board of directors made or implemented after the registrant last provided disclosure in response to the requirements of Item 407(c)(2)(iv) of Regulation S-K (17 CFR 229.407), or this Item.
Item 11. Controls and Procedures.
(a)
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The registrant's principal executive officer and principal financial officer have concluded that the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Rule 30a- 3(c) under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the "1940 Act")) are effective as of a date within 90 days of the filing date of this report that includes the disclosure required by this paragraph, based on their evaluation of the disclosure controls and procedures required by Rule 30a-3(b) under the 1940 Act and 15d-15(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
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(b)
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There were no changes in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Rule 30a-3(d) under the 1940 Act) that occurred during the registrant's second fiscal quarter of the period covered by the report that have materially affected, or are likely to materially affect the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.
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Item 12. Exhibits.
(a)
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Certifications pursuant to Rule 30a-2(a) under the Investment Company Act of 1940(17 CFR 270.360a-2) attached hereto as Exhibits EX-31 and certifications pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 attached hereto as Exhibit EX-32.
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SIGNATURES
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Company Act of 1940, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned, thereunto duly authorized.
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Foxby Corp.
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March 11, 2011
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By: /s/ Thomas B. Winmill
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Thomas B. Winmill
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President
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Foxby Corp.
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March 11, 2011
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By: /s/ Thomas O’Malley
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Thomas O’Malley
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Chief Financial Officer
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Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Company Act of 1940, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed below by the following persons on behalf of the registrant and in the capacities and on the dates indicated.
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Foxby Corp.
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March 11, 2011
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By: /s/ Thomas B. Winmill
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Thomas B. Winmill
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President
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Foxby Corp.
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March 11, 2011
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By: /s/ Thomas O’Malley
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Thomas O’Malley
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Chief Financial Officer
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